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In the face of the coronavirus pandemic, clinicians are looking to multiple sources for 
guidance. Good guidance provides a helpful tool to support decision making by experienced 
and highly-trained healthcare professionals. However, in the context of a readily changing 
landscape there are risks of guidance that hinders rather than helps, duplicates effort and 
fails to consider the front-line implications. Conversely, an overly conservative approach 
may result in good guidance never seeing the light of day, or being published too late.  
We suggest that there are key principles that may help guideline producers to improve the 
process. These include: addressing directly and transparently the competing risks and 
benefits to individual patients, staff and the wider community; making greater efforts to 
find reliable data to inform recommendations; ensuring duplication of effort and conflict 
with extant guidance is minimised; involving front-line staff in development and 
consideration of real-world implications of delivery; and ensuring that feedback and 
revisions are integral to the process. 
The MORAL Balance framework has previously been advocated for making complex 
individual patient level decision in critical care. We believe the same process can be applied 
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In the face of the coronavirus pandemic, clinicians are looking to multiple sources for 
guidance. Clinical experience and professional training remain the bedrock for every 
healthcare practitioner, but guidance to support difficult decisions is needed. In an ideal 
world there might be a series of definitive randomised controlled trials covering key areas – 
who benefits from critical care admission, what are the risks of operating, or not operating? 
Even good quality observational data would be helpful with all the caveats of confounding, 
association and causation. To a large extent these are lacking for obvious reasons. So, 
healthcare workers and national organisations are trying to respond at great speed in a 
rapidly changing environment with the production and implementation of guidance.  These 
are inevitably at best based on partial data, translation of theory and evidence from other 
situations, and collective wisdom. 
 
Just as evidence-based medicine has a hierarchy of evidence, so we can consider a hierarchy 
of guidance. International guidance (World Health Organisation), national guidance from 
the ‘centre’ (Government, courts, NHS England / Improvement in England, UK1, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention in the US2), followed by national collegiate guidance (such 
as Colleges and speciality associations3), local (NHS Trust or hospital grouping / hospital), 
departmental and so on. Whether this translates into a hierarchy of acceptance of such 
guidance is unclear. There is some evidence that in normal times for doctors, sources of 
influence from colleagues from the medical profession are judged more legitimate than 
professional or medical associations,4 we are not aware of empirical evidence of how 
healthcare professionals prioritise guidance in a crisis situation. There is inevitably a tension 
between a perceived need for military-style ‘command and control’ and the professional 
and individual autonomy to create and challenge centrally produced guidance.  
 
Clinical guidelines normally take months or even years to produce5, 6, and are then subject 
to regular review and critique and updated as the evidence changes. Guidance is often 
required precisely because the evidence base is weak, or conflicted, and can therefore act 
as a catalyst for better quality data. Guidance in the COVID pandemic is coming out in days, 
and new versions of the same guidance days after that. The inevitable consequence will be 
that some is simply wrong, some is poorly written and some is found to be wanting in 
hindsight. Duplication of effort and, perhaps worse, contradictory guidance, wastes time 
and energy and undermines trust.  The corollary is that some good guidance will never see 
the light of day, be published too late, or lost in the tidal wave of information overload we 
are all experiencing.  
 
Rather than criticising any particular guidance, we would like to draw on recent experience 
of writing some national guidance7, 8, and the implementation and training of national 
guidance at a local level. We hope to draw out for readers, and perhaps for guideline 
groups, some of the issues that we face. 
 
A fundamental question is which competing outcomes are we are trying to balance.  
 
There might be risks to the patient directly. Does coronavirus infection make outcomes 
worse after surgery, and importantly how does that compare to not having that surgery? Is 
having a different operation, or none at all, likely to produce a short or long-term harm or 
benefit for the patient? The coronavirus epidemic is not a short-lived crisis. Choosing to limit 
investigation and treatment of curable life-limiting diseases – benign or malignant – is going 
to cause significant harm to those otherwise barely touched by coronavirus infection.  
 
What about other patients? We are working in a severely resource constrained 
environment. Most obvious is intensive care capacity – personnel, space and equipment, 
but other resources are at a premium. Operating theatre time is limited – due to the triple 
hits of staff sickness, diversion of staff to other areas and longer turnaround times for 
infection prevention and control. Impacts elsewhere in health and social care must not be 
forgotten – avoiding surgery or changing operative approaches to mitigate impact on the 
operating room may have a fairly predictable effect of increasing workload on nursing and 
social care staff – to the detriment of others.  
 
And what about the staff themselves? All healthcare workers are exposing themselves to 
risk working with patients with known and unknown coronavirus status. At the benign end 
COVID is an unpleasant illness, at its worst it has caused the deaths of nurses and doctors in 
several countries. The knock-on effect of staff absence through self-isolation is significant, 
and in turn impacts on patients and colleagues. 
 
Are there any solutions to these complex issues? We will hesitantly suggest a few questions 
guideline writers might consider:  
 
We have previously described an ethical decision making framework - MORAL Balance9, 10 - 
to guide clinicians in making patient-centred shared decisions. An explicit ethical framework 
helps ensure decisions take account of the available facts and data, recognise all of the 
relevant outcomes to the individuals and groups involved, before reaching a balanced 




Make sure of the Facts. Has the group considered the robustness of the data they are using? 
Are they extrapolating from other scenarios in a reasonable way? If there is uncertainty can 
it be quantified? There are some good data out there, and some research groups have made 
huge strides in trying to synthesise the research evidence in impressively short spaces of 
time.11 These groups are responsive and expert – so there seems little reason not to seek 
their advice.  
 
Have other stakeholders been involved in the decisions? Some guideline development 
groups seem to have involved more than others. Making pronouncements that affect 
colleagues outside our own professional groups, without seeking their views, hardly 
engenders trust and risks making simple, avoidable mistakes.  
 
It is vital that all outcomes of relevance for all those involved in the decision are taken into 
account and specified. For example, who is going to benefit from the decisions and 
recommendations in the guidance and how? Where is the harm, is it physical, psychological, 
financial, emotional? Are there other outcomes, perhaps difficult to articulate or admit that 
are influencing decision making, for concerns about liability in a legal or a moral sense, or 
worries about media and public scrutiny? If so, are these influences justified and 
commensurate?  
 
The use of a framework doesn’t solve these problems or resolve all disagreements, and 
certainly doesn’t prevent conflict between competing outcomes, for example staff versus 
patient safety. But it does facilitate a clear understanding of which factors are influencing 
decision making. Subsequent decisions are more transparent, better justified, and more 
robust. 
 
Guidance without implementation is pointless. If there is conflict between existing 
documents, is the subsequent impact (need for rapid change, confusion, misunderstanding) 
justified? Is implementation credible in the real-world - have the implications for personnel, 
training, time and equipment been considered? Have clinicians with current, front-line 
experience been actively involved in development? 
 
Finally, what is the mechanism to adapt and revise? No guidance is ever perfect – even 
before these times. Clearly a balance needs to be struck between endless revisions leaving 
people confused, and a responsive, responsible attitude that realises when guidance just 
doesn’t work or the data have improved. It is good science to change our view when new 
evidence comes to light. 
 
High level guidance is the science and the art of translating a complex, messy, constantly 
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 Action  Example 
M Make Sure of the Facts Evidence base, uncertainty, 




Identify Outcomes of  
Relevance to the 
Mortality, morbidity, safety, 
capacity, resource utilisation, 
system efficiency, psychological & 
emotional impact 
A Agents involved To whom do these outcomes 
accrue? Who has a moral stake in 
the outcome ? Patients, families, 
staff, public, future patients, 
government 
L Populate then Level out the 
arguments  
Specify these outcomes within the 
four ethical principles 
(beneficence, non-maleficence, 
autonomy, justice). To which 
principle might each fact and 
outcome be applied?  
Balance Use a balancing box Consider asking three questions: 
(i) Anything of particular note?  
(ii) Where is the greatest conflict? 
(iii) Where is the greatest 
congruence (agreement)?  
 
Adapted from references 8 and 9.  
 
 
 
